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GIBBS AND OTHERS VS. FREMONT. 1
In an action against the drawer of a bill of exchange not bearing interest, which
has been dishonored by non-acceptance, if the jury find the plaintiff entitled to
interest by way of damages, the measure of damages is the rate of interest at the
place where the bill was drawn.

July 6, 1853.-This was an action by the plaintiffs, as indorsees
of several bills of exchange, drawn by the defendant in the following form:"Los Angelos, Upper California.-March 18, 1847.-At ten
days' sight of'this, my second of exchange, (first and'third remaining unpaid), pay to F. Huttman or order 6,000 hard dollars, for
value received, and charge the same to the account of your obedient
servant, J. 0.Fremont, of the United States, Washington, Governor of California.-To Hon. J. Buchanan, Secretary of State. of the
United States, Washington." There were other similar bills, making
in the whole 19,600 dollars.
At the trial, before Alderson, B., at the Middlesex Sittings, in
Easter term, it appeared that the defendant, on the occasion of his
conquering California, having need of money, had drawn these bills,
which had been discounted by F. Huttman, upon the Secretary of
State at Washington; and that they were duly presented for acceptance in October, 1847, the defendant then being at Washington,
but dishonored. The rate of interest at Washington was found by •
the jury to be six per cent., and in California twenty-five per cent.
The jury also found that there was damage to the plaintiffs which
they ought to receive as interest, but that that damage was only to
be calculated at six per cent. The verdict was according entered
for the amount of the bills, and interest at six per cent., with liberty
to the plaintiffs to move to increase the damages by the addition of
nineteen per cent.
122 L. J.Exch. 302.

GIBBS AND OTHERS vs. FREMONT.

A rule was accordingly obtained by Sir A. E. Cockburn, (the
Attorney-General), against which cause was shown by
Bovill and Aspland.a"
Willes, in support of the rule.
Judgment was delivered by
ALDERSON, B.-The general rule in all cases like the present is,
that the lez loci contractus is to govern-in the construction of the
instrument, but that applies only when the contract is not express;
if it is special, it must be construed according to the express terms
in which it is framed. 'Now, a bill drawn on a third person in discharge of a present debt is, in truth, an offer by the drawer, that if
the payee will give time for payment, he will give an order on his
debtor to pay a given sum at a given time and place. Tho payee
agrees to accept this order, and to give the time, with a proviso
that if the aceptor does not pay, and he, the payee, or the holder
of the bill gives notice to the drawer of that default, the drawer
shall pay him the amount specified in the bill, with lawf'l interest.
This is, then, the contract between the parties. If the interest be
expressly or by necessary implication specified on the face of the
bill, then the interest is governed by the terms of' the contract
itself; but if not, it seems to follow the rate of interest of the place
where the contract is made; so if the mode of performing it be.
expressly or impliedly specified, as was the case of Rotzchild vs.
Currie.2 In the case of a bill drawn at A, it primafacie bears
interest as a debt At A would, if nothing else appeared; but if that
bill be indorsed at B, the indorser is a new drawer, and it may be a
.question whether this indorsement is a new drawing of a bill at B,
or only a new drawing.of the same bill, that is, a bill expressly made
at A. In the former case it would carry interest at the rate at'B,
in the latter at the rate at A; and on this subject we find a difference of opinion in the books,-Mr.. Justice Story, in -his Conflict of
Laws, s. 814, maintaining the former, and Pardemus, .Droitdu
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Commerce, art. 1500, maintaining the latter opinion. But this
case is a contract at San Francisco, by which the defendant there
offers to pay to the payee, in discharge of a debt due there, the
payment at Washington, by the acceptor thereof, of a given sum.
That sum is not paid. The defendant's original liability then
revives on notice of dishonor duly given to him, and ihe defendant
has become liable to pay as he was liable at the first. At first he
was clearly to have paid the money at San Francisco, and if he did
not, he would have been liable to pay interest at the usual rate in
California, for a period as long as the debt remained unpaid: and
that is the amount which he ought to pay now. This point was
expressly ruled in Allen vs. Zemble.' It was also so ruled in C'ougan vs. Bankes;2 and this is not to be left to the jury, for it
depends on the rule of law. The amount of interest at each place
is to be so lefi; so is the question whether any damage has been
sustained by non-payment of interest at all-for these are questions
of fact. Here the jury have found interest was due, and that there
was damage which ought to be recovered in the shape of interest.
They also have found what the usual rate of such interest is at
Washington, and what the usual rate of such interest is in California; but which rate is to be adopted by them is, so we think, a
question purely of law for the direction of the Judge to the jury.
We think the direction in this case should have been that the California rate of interest should be adopted by them, inasmuch as the
contract was made in California; and, therefore, this rule must be
absolute, to enter the verdict for the plaintiffs, with nineteen per
cent. additional interest to the six per cent. already allowed.
Rule absolute.
16 Moore's P. C. 314.
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